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Abstract 
We show how an interaction between the skewness of the sex ratio and the jump in divorce rates 
after a liberalization in divorce laws can obtain in a model of marriage market matching with 
non-transferable utility. This model is partly motivated by a significant cross-country correlation 
between these two variables. We also find that men’s hopes or fears about women’s marriage 
market odds are self-confirming under mutual consent, resulting in multiple equilibria. The 
multiplicity vanishes with a more skewed sex ratio or a liberalization of divorce laws. Our work 
sheds some light on the possible implications of divorce liberalization and pro-marriage policies. 
JEL Classification : J12, K36,D82 
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1. Introduction 
Recent research in law and economics has explored the impact of changes in divorce laws 
(notably from fault to no-fault, or mutual consent to unilateral divorce regimes) on other 
outcomes, including marriage market outcomes.  An exogenous change in laws which alters the 
ease with which a divorce may be obtained can have implications for the frequency of marriage 
and divorce, particularly if models of Coasian bargaining within the family are considered 
unrealistic.  The bulk of theoretical and empirical research on this topic2 indicates a consensus 
that a liberalization of the divorce regime increases divorce rates, at least in the short run, though 
conclusions about long-run implications are more ambiguous. 
 A seemingly unrelated topic of much research among development economists has been 
imbalance in sex ratios – the phenomenon of “missing women” in China and India, for example.  
A poor sex ratio is a feature of many developing countries, some of which have faced a ratio 
which actually deteriorates over time (as in many Indian states). At the other extreme, some 
western countries have started facing the other type of imbalance – with too many women 
compared to men.  When development economists have looked at sex ratios, they have mainly 
tried to work on possible causes of imbalance in sex ratios.  Some have looked at whether sex 
ratios can be affected by changes in women’s bargaining power or economic clout which might 
affect mothers’ ability to care better for their daughters or to oppose female infanticide or 
deliberate malnutrition which daughters might otherwise face in societies marked by a strong 
preference for sons. 
 To the best of our knowledge, there has been no work on possible interaction effects 
between the sex ratio and the response of divorce rates to a liberalization in divorce laws 
(although there has been research – alluded to in the literature review – on the effects that sex 
ratios and divorce regimes may independently have on other outcomes like female labor supply ; 
there has also been some empirical evidence on the impact of sex ratios on divorce rates, but not 
of how sex ratios impact changes in the divorce rate following a change in divorce laws). Why 
should we be interested in modeling such an interaction effect? We discuss shortly why such an 
interaction effect makes intuitive sense. Our developing a theoretical model that provides a 
foundation for such an effect was in addition motivated by the discovery of a positive and 
significant cross-country correlation (with a coefficient of .547) between sex ratios and the size 
                                                 
2 A literature review will follow. 
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of the jump in divorce rates following a transition from mutual consent to unilateral divorce. In 
other words, countries with more skewed sex ratios experienced a larger jump in divorce rates 
when they transited from mutual consent to unilateral divorce regimes (the countries in question 
include a cross section of European countries, Australia and New Zealand).3  
While a correlation does not provide evidence of causality, it was sufficient to induce us 
to build a theoretical model that ties these two areas – divorce law changes and imbalances in sex 
ratios – together in the present paper.  Instead of focusing on the causes of sex ratio imbalance, 
we focus on the consequences of unbalanced sex ratios, given that such imbalance is a current 
reality.   
The intuition underlying our model is the following. It would be reasonable to suppose 
that an unbalanced sex ratio would affect interactions within a marriage, as well as the frequency 
of marriage and the likelihood of divorce conditional on marriage.  One channel of influence 
would be that men and women would have different degrees of advantage in the marriage market 
– their differing numbers would imply different degrees of success in search for a partner.  How 
does this tie up with divorce laws? When we consider that the possibility of remarriage after a 
divorce must be factored into the value of divorce as an “outside option” in a marriage, we can 
see that this outside option’s value would also differ across the sexes.  If one sex expects a much 
better chance of getting remarried in case of a divorce, it would affect this sex’s willingness to 
get divorced.  The divorce law regime becomes important here because a shift to unilateral 
divorce laws implies that a spouse may obtain a divorce easily even if his or her partner is 
unwilling.  Conversely, if laws require mutual consent for divorce, the actual frequency of 
divorce will be dictated by the preferences of the partner who is less willing to divorce – partly 
perhaps due to poorer remarriage options. This intuition holds provided we rule out perfect 
costless bargaining between spouses (an assumption discussed in more detail later). 
 Thus, our focus in this paper is not on whether and in which direction divorce regime 
liberalization affects the divorce rate in the short or long run – a topic on which there is much 
controversy – but on the role of the sex ratio in a framework of marriage, divorce and remarriage 
and its interplay with shifts in the divorce regime. As an interesting by-product, we find that 
under a mutual consent divorce regime, men’s hopes or fears about women’s marriage market 
odds are self-confirming, creating either a “hopeful equilibrium” where women face good 
                                                 
3 Readers are referred to the appendix for details on the correlations. 
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marriage prospects and more men are willing to marry, or a “fearful equilibrium” where women 
face poor marriage prospects and few men marry. This effect disappears either with a transition 
to unilateral divorce laws or with a heavily skewed sex ratio. 
 To focus exclusively on the effects of an asymmetric sex ratio, we abstract from other 
possible sources of asymmetry between the sexes on the marriage market, such as property 
settlement laws that redistribute wealth in the event of divorce or marriage payments (dowry, 
brideprice). For the same reason we also abstract from differences in intrinsic preferences 
between the genders. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a brief literature review. 
Section 3 contains our model and its solution, along with comparative statics on the effects of 
varying sex ratios. Section 4 concludes with some discussion of the policy implications of our 
results. 
 
2. Some Relevant Literature 
 Theoretical research on the impact of divorce laws on divorce rates dates back to Becker 
(1977, 1981) who argued that a shift to a unilateral divorce regime should not impact divorce 
rates as it merely re-assigns “property rights” within a marriage. This assumed Coasian 
bargaining was possible between spouses. Similar models based on Nash bargaining include 
McElroy and Horney (1981). 
 However, later models [Parkman (1992), Stevenson and Wolfers (2006)] have questioned 
the assumption that Coasian bargaining applies to the marital framework.  Pollak (1985) 
discusses the role of transaction costs in marriage. Clark (1999) and Fella et al (2004) have also 
shown that divorce law changes may impact divorce rates even in the absence of transaction 
costs and asymmetric information. Rasul (2006) has a matching model in which a shift to 
unilateral divorce increases divorce rates in the short run but in which this increase may taper off 
or even reverse over the long run. Wickelgren (2009) has a model of marital investments in 
which these investments are affected by the divorce regime and where, as in Rasul (2006), 
divorce rates increase following liberalization but then taper off. 
 Empirical work on this theme has also yielded mixed results. While Peters (1986,1992) 
found an effect of unilateral divorce laws close to zero in his study of US states, Allen (1992) 
found a marked effect of unilateral divorce laws in increasing the divorce rate, as did Friedberg 
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(1998) : however Wolfers (2006) found that the effect was small particularly over the long run. 
While all these studies focused on the US, exploiting differences in the timing of divorce law 
changes across states, Gonzalez and Viitanen (2006) focus on Europe and find that divorce law 
liberalization accounts for about 20% of the increase in divorce rates in Europe between 1960 
and 2002. 
 The focus of the present paper is however not on whether or by how much divorce rates 
change in response to shifts in divorce regimes. It is focused instead on how such change (or the 
lack of it) is influenced by the extent of skewness of the sex ratio.  Thus the paper examines the 
interaction between divorce rates, divorce law shifts and the sex ratio. 
 Work on sex ratios within development economics is extensive.  We only mention the 
most relevant here. Angrist (2002) empirically studies immigrants to the US. Using the fact that 
such immigrants have a high incidence of endogamy (marrying within the community) and 
skewed sex ratios, he studies the impact on women’s marriage rates, as well as other outcomes 
like labor force participation and earnings.  His findings are broadly consistent with the theory 
that a favorable sex ratio increases women’s bargaining power within the household. However, 
divorce and incentives to divorce, or the impact of divorce laws, are not explored.  
Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix (2002) also emphasize the idea that factors such as 
favorable sex ratios and divorce laws that are generous to women improve a woman’s outside 
option in the event of marital dissolution, thereby increasing her bargaining power within the 
marriage and affecting her labor supply. They provide empirical evidence that women’s labor 
supply falls with a sex ratio that favors women, or with a divorce regime that favors women. 
Lafortune (2009) shows that pre-marital investments (specifically investment in education) 
respond to the sex ratio.  Incidentally this paper also contains some empirical evidence on the 
effect of sex ratios on divorce (showing that men are more likely to be divorced when the ratio of 
men to women is high, though the effect was not significant), but not on the impact of sex ratios 
on a change in divorce rates following a shift in divorce regime.  
Other work on sex ratios includes Edlund (1999) who shows that biased sex ratios may 
be caused by son preference and explores the relationship between unbalanced sex ratios and 
marriage patterns like spousal age gaps, hypergamy (women marrying up), within-caste 
marriages, and cousin marriages.  Her focus is on the causes of a sex ratio imbalance, and she 
does not explore the link between sex ratios and divorce, or even between sex ratios and the 
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incidence of marriage.  Qian (2006) empirically sheds light on how greater bargaining power 
within the household for women can influence their capability to choose the sex ratio of their 
children.  While relating sex ratios to within-marriage outcomes this study again looks at the 
causes rather than the consequences of sex ratio imbalances (unlike the present study). 
 
3. A Model 
3.1 Assumptions and Timing 
We assume a multi-period model in which individuals – both males and females – have a 
probability 1-β of dying in any one period. The number of births in each period exactly matches 
the number of deaths so that the population remains constant. To begin with, we assume a stable 
steady state sex ratio of f (>1 without loss of generality, so that there are more females than 
males). To simplify things, we assume that this ratio is the same across all birth cohorts so that 
there is no difference between sex ratio at birth and the overall sex ratio in the population.4 We 
also assume that both males and females may choose to enter the marriage market in the first 
period of life. M new males and F new females are born in each period, with F = fM : however 
all of these do not necessarily enter the marriage market. A number NSj, j = M, F of either sex 
choose to deliberately stay single by staying off the marriage market (we will endogenize the 
number of such singles shortly). 
 An important assumption is that men and women have no information at the time of 
meeting a potential match regarding their compatibility post-marriage with this match (as 
opposed to any other matches).  Therefore, if a man or woman on the marriage market meets a 
potential match, nothing is to be gained by prolonging the search for a marriage partner, as 
information is not sufficient to distinguish the match they meet from any one else.  Those who 
meet a match will marry, while only those who cannot find a match (there are always some of 
these in our model due to a skewed sex ratio) will prolong their search into future periods.  The 
only information known to men and women before marriage is a distribution of possible “post-
marriage levels of satisfaction” denoted by the cdf G[φ ] and density g(φ ) where φ  is any value 
of per-period post-marriage satisfaction5 drawn from a distribution with support [φ ,φ ].  Thus 
                                                 
4 We will later perform comparative static exercises to compute the effects of a change in sex ratio. 
5 Note that this refers to satisfaction that obtains conditional on the marriage remaining intact. 
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men and women know the distribution and by implication also know the average level of per-
period post marriage satisfaction they can obtain, E(φ ) where 
E(φ ) = ( )dg
φ
φ
φ φ∫                                                 (1) 
However they do not know the exact realization of φ  that will obtain if they marry a particular 
partner. 
 The assumption that this information becomes known only after marriage and is not 
revealed during courtship may be questioned by some. While strong, this assumption underlines 
the fact that there is a qualitative difference in a couple’s interaction after they marry. While 
partial information revelation during courtship could be allowed for by introducing an 
(imprecise) signal of post-marriage satisfaction during the courtship period, we make the no-
information assumption in the interests of simplicity. 
 After marriage, the married couple draws a realization ofφ . This realization remains 
constant: for every period the marriage survives, the couple will continue to draw a per-period 
satisfaction level of φ  (and this is known to the couple). 
 An individual i obtains a per period satisfaction si by staying off the marriage market. We 
will suppress the subscript wherever possible. Thus s varies across individuals and is distributed 
with a cdf H(s) with density h(s), on the interval [ s , s ]. Each individual’s s is private 
information known only to this individual, though every one knows the distribution H(s). We 
assume that both males and females face identical distributions. Moreover we have 
A1: E(φ ) = ( )dg
φ
φ
φ φ∫ > E(s) = ( )s
s
sdh s∫  
 This assumption means that if we aggregate across individuals (of either sex), the average 
per-period satisfaction from staying off the marriage market is less than the expected value of the 
per-period post-marriage satisfaction level. Note that this does not imply that every individual 
expects higher satisfaction from marriage than from staying single. 
 The timing of the game is as follows. Every period, men and women decide whether to 
enter the marriage market. Those on the marriage market attempt to find a match. Those that find 
a match get married. Married couples draw a realization, in the first period after marriage, of the 
per-period satisfaction they will continue to get conditional on the marriage remaining intact. 
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They then form (differing) preferences on whether to continue with the marriage or to seek a 
divorce. The type of divorce law in place (unilateral or mutual consent) will determine the actual 
frequency of divorces given these preferences. Freshly divorced people join the marriage market 
(we will prove later that they will never have an incentive to go off the marriage market) and the 
cycle of search, marriage and possible divorce continues. 
 We have made two other important assumptions in our analysis. First, we assume that 
utility is non-transferable between spouses. If utility were completely transferable, there would 
be no difference in divorce rates between unilateral and mutual consent regimes. If, for example, 
a husband wanted to divorce but his wife did not, the husband could, even under a mutual 
consent divorce regime, “compensate” his wife so that she would allow him to leave. Similarly, 
the wife could compensate her husband to persuade him to stay, even in a unilateral divorce 
regime. However, the fact that empirical studies have found that divorce rates change with 
divorce laws indicates that such Coasian bargaining within the household is implausible. Our 
assumption is also made in other models on marriage and divorce (eg Rasul (2006)). As an 
alternative to non-transferable utility, we could assume transaction costs in bargaining. As long 
as transferability is imperfect, our qualitative results would continue to hold as there would be 
some difference in divorce rates between the two divorce regimes. We do not explicitly model 
transaction costs, but assuming that they are too high to allow spouses to compensate each other 
is equivalent to ruling out Coasian bargaining. 
 Finally, we also make the assumption that there is no particular stigma against a divorcee. 
This is because φ  should be regarded as a couple-specific utility. If individual i and individual j 
prove to be incompatible after marriage, this does not indicate that individual i would also be 
incompatible with individual k. Therefore, divorce carries no “signal” of intrinsic unworthiness. 
Here we follow assumptions made in other types of matching models, for instance, in Shapiro 
and Stiglitz (1984). Shapiro and Stiglitz assume that there is no stigma against workers who are 
fired by one firm, so that other firms make no distinction between them and never-matched 
workers and are equally willing to take either type out of the unemployment pool.6  
 
3.2 Solving the Model 
                                                 
6 In their model new prospective employers merely regard a worker having shirked in his previous job as a sign that 
his previous employer was not paying him enough. The history of shirking conveys nothing about the worker’s type. 
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M men are born in every period and M - NSM of them enter the marriage market (where NSM is to 
be endogenized later). These men are all assured of finding a partner due to a sex ratio that 
favors men. This is not immediately obvious. Even if there are more women than men, if the 
proportion of women who chose to voluntarily stay single is much larger than the corresponding 
proportion of such men, this may not hold. However, we will show later that this is not the case: 
the proportion of men who stay off the marriage market is even larger than the corresponding 
proportion for women. For the time being, we proceed under the assumption (proved to hold 
later) that all men on the marriage market are indeed assured of finding a partner, or 
equivalently, that the number of women on the marriage market exceeds the number of men on 
it. 
As search costs are zero and as people have no information about the relative merits of 
the potential matches they meet, no man has an incentive to prolong his search. Therefore, at any 
point in time, the marriage market only contains two types of men – those who have just entered 
it in their first period of life and those who are freshly divorced (we denote this number by D : D 
will shortly be endogenized. We will prove later that men who are freshly divorced will never 
stay off the marriage market. Intuitively, this is because only men who have a low utility from 
staying single get married in the first place: such men continue to have a low utility from staying 
off the marriage market, even post divorce). Of the men on the marriage market, there are none 
who have been unsuccessful in finding a partner in previous periods.  Moreover, all divorced 
men can also find partners by the end of any period. Partners have no preference between 
divorced and never-married potential matches, because divorce in our model conveys no signal 
of intrinsic unworthiness and only signals that the divorcee was incompatible with his or her 
previous match. 
 In contrast, not all women who enter the marriage market are assured of immediate 
success in finding a partner. Therefore, apart from women who have newly entered the marriage 
market (there are fM - NSF of these, where NSF is to endogenized) or from freshly divorced 
women (who, like freshly divorced men, always re-enter the marriage market, for similar 
reasons), the marriage market at any point in time also contains (a) women who have never been 
married but who were unsuccessful in finding a partner in previous periods, and (b) women who 
were previously divorced but failed to find a partner.  Again, at any point in time the number of 
freshly divorced women is D (to be endogenized later) as the number of newly divorced women 
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must equal the number of newly divorced men. Let p be the steady state probability of a woman 
on the marriage market successfully finding a match in any given period (p will also be 
endogenized later). Then we have the following relationship : 
1 (1 )
SF SMfM D N M D N
p pβ
+ − + −
=
− −
                                             (2) 
We derive (2) as follows. The left hand side shows the number of women on the marriage market 
in any period. This includes not only women who have newly entered the marriage market (who 
number F- NSF = fM- NSF) and newly divorced women (numbering D), but also surviving never-
married and divorced women who entered the marriage market in previous periods but were 
unsuccessful in finding matches. The denominator comes from adding these women.7  On the 
right hand side, the number of men on the marriage market is simply M+D- NSM (men who have 
freshly entered the marriage market, or freshly divorced men). The number of women on the 
marriage market must be a multiple 1/p of the number of men on the marriage market to result in 
a steady state probability p of a woman who is “single and looking” finding a match in any 
period. 
 Rearranging (2), we get 
[( ) (1 )] (1 )(1 ) [1 (1 )]SF SMM f p pN D p p Nβ β β β− − − − = − − − − −          (3) 
 
3.3Unilateral Divorce 
     3.3.1 The Basics  
We now examine divorce under a unilateral divorce regime. We start by examining men’s 
payoffs to (a) staying married if already in a marriage, Vm(MR)(b) joining the ranks of the 
“single and looking”, Vm(SL)and (c) staying off the marriage market, Vm(SNL). We have 
( ) max[ ( ), ( )]m m mV SNL s V SNL V SLβ= +                                          (4) 
Here, we have suppressed the subscript i on the per-period satisfaction that man i gets from 
staying off the marriage market. The second term on the RHS of (4) indicates that if he survives 
into the next period he can choose either to stay as he is or to enter the pool of those single and 
looking. We also have 
( ) ( ) max[ ( ), ( ), ( )]m m m mV SL E V MR V SL V SNLφ β= +                                  (5) 
                                                 
7 That is, we have a GP with first term fM+D- NSF and common ratio β(1-p) [the probability of survival times the 
probability of being unsuccessful in finding a match]. 
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Equation (5) denotes the anticipated utility of a man at the beginning of the period in which he is 
contemplating entering the marriage market. As soon as he enters the market, he expects to find a 
match, from which he gets the expected satisfaction of a match E(Φ)  (note that he will only get 
information on the true satisfaction in his particular match after the first period of marriage). 
Such a man, if he survives into the next period, then faces the choice of staying married, getting 
divorced and re-entering the marriage market, and getting divorced and going off the marriage 
market. Again, suppressing subscripts, the satisfaction that a married man gets from continuing 
in the marriage is given by 
( ) [ ( ), ( ), ( )]m m m mV MR Max V MR V SL V SNLφ β= +                                         (6) 
Here φ  is the true quality of his match (revealed after the first period of marriage). At any point 
in time he will stay married if the continuation value of that option exceeds the expected value 
from getting divorced and either re-entering the marriage market or of getting divorced and 
staying off the marriage market. 
Proposition 1: Divorcees always re-enter the marriage market. 
Proof: Any man who got married in the first place must have been on the marriage market to 
start with. Hence we can infer that for such a man, ( ) ( )m mV SL V SNL> . Thus when a married 
man considers the option of divorce, he only has to choose between staying married and re-
entering the marriage market as a divorcee (an option which strictly dominates going off the 
marriage market). A similar logic applies to women who divorce: hence divorcees always re-
enter the pool of the single and looking. Q.E.D. 
A married man will therefore stay married if and only if ( ) ( )m mV MR V SL> . From (5) 
and (6), we can show that this is equivalent to 
( )Eφ φ>  
- an event that will happen with probability 1-G( ( )E φ ). With probability G( ( )E φ ), his match is 
revealed to be of sufficiently poor quality to induce him to seek a divorce and re-enter the 
marriage market. 
 Note that men who choose to stay off the marriage market have 
( ) max[ ( ), ( )]m m mV SNL V SL V MR> : for such men, we can show, using (4) and (5), that s > E(φ ). 
This happens for a fraction 1 – H(E(φ )) of men who have high enough utilities from staying 
single.  
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Men who do not choose to stay single, on the other hand, have s < E(φ ). This must be 
true of any ever-married man. Men are more willing to divorce as they face better remarriage 
prospects than women: under unilateral divorce, it is their preferences that matter. Thus the 
divorce rate is G[ ( )E φ ]. A proportion 1 – H[ ( )E φ ] of men in each cohort stay off the marriage 
market as they have a high utility from staying single. 
What about women’s decision of whether to enter the marriage market? The adverse sex 
ratio against women always results in women’s being less keen on a divorce relative to men. 
However, they know that if their husband divorces them, they will return willy-nilly to the pool 
of the single and looking – even if they would have preferred to continue with the marriage. A 
woman’s anticipated utility from entering the marriage market is now denoted by 
, , ,
( )
( )
[1 ( ( ))]( ) ( ) (1 ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ( )) ( )
1
[1 ( ( ))]( ) (1 ) ( )
1
1 [1 (1 ( ( )))]
f a f a f a
E
E
p G EV SL pE p s p V SL dg pG E V SL
p G EpE p s dg
p G E
φ
φ
φ
φ
β φφ β φ φ β φβ
β φφ φ φβ
β φ
−
= + − + − + +
−
−
+ − +
−
=
− − −
∫
∫
(7) 
 (7) can be explained as follows. A woman expects that in the first period of entering the 
marriage market, her search will be successful with probability p, in which case she gets the 
expected value of post-marriage satisfaction ( )E φ . With probability 1-p she gets s, which is her 
individual utility from singlehood. If this happens, and she survives into the next period, she 
again gets the expected utility of a woman entering the marriage market, and this happens with 
probability β(1-p). If she is successful in finding a match, and survives into the next period, 
which happens with probability βp, then for a match quality above ( )E φ , she continues in the 
marriage. Prior to entering the match, she does not know its actual quality, but knows that if it 
continues it must be of quality between ( )E φ and the maximum quality φ , and can hence 
calculate the expected match quality conditional on remaining married.  However for match 
quality below ( )E φ , she expects to be divorced by her husband and to re-enter the marriage 
market as a single. 
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 From (7), we can see that a woman will not enter the marriage market if and only if 
, ( )
1
f a sV SL β< − . Collecting common terms and simplifying, we find that this condition boils 
down to 
( )
(1 ) ( ) (1 ( ( )) ( )
*
1 ( ( ))
E
E G E dg
s s
G E
φ
φ
β φ β φ φ φ
β φ
− + −
> =
−
∫
                             (8) 
Thus a proportion 1 – H(s*) of women in each cohort stay off the marriage market. As s* is 
independent of p, from (8), the proportion of women who stay off the marriage market is 
independent of p. 
Proposition 2: A greater proportion of men than women stay off the marriage market. 
Proof : We have 
( )(1 ( ( )) ( )(1 ) (1 ( ( )) ( )E G E E G E Eφ β φ φ β β φ φ− = − + −  
<
( )
( )(1 ) (1 ( ( ))) ( )
E
E G E dg
φ
φ
φ β β φ φ φ− + − ∫  
or ( )E φ < s*. Hence 1 – H( ( )E φ ) > 1 – H(s*). QED. 
Thus from Proposition 2, and given that the total number of women exceeds the total number 
of men, our initial assumption that the number of women on the marriage market exceeds the 
number of men on it is shown to be true. 
3.3.2 Equilibrium 
Equilibrium under unilateral divorce is characterized by a quadruple (p**, D**(M), 
N**SF(M), N**SM(M)) such that  
(a) The number of men on the marriage market is a fraction p** of the number of women on 
the marriage market. 
(b)All men on the marriage market get married. 
(c)No one who is off the marriage market expects to get higher utility by entering it. 
(d)All divorcees re-enter the marriage market. 
(e)Divorces occur when a man expects to get higher utility by re-entering the marriage 
market than by staying in his current match. Women may have to re-enter the marriage 
market when they would have preferred to continue in their current match, but take this into 
account when deciding whether to enter the marriage market. 
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From the preceding analysis, we have 
N**SF(M)=[1 – H(s*)]fM                                              (9) 
where s* is defined by (14), 
N**SM(M)=[1 – H(E(φ ))]M                                             (10) 
And 
D**(M) = G( ( )E φ )(M –  N**SM(M))= G( ( )E φ )H( ( )E φ )M                      (11) 
We may now solve for p** using (3) and (9)-(11) : simplifying, we obtain 
** ( *) [1 (1 **)](1 ( ( )) ( ( )) ** ( ( )) ( ( ))fp H s p G E H E p G E H Eβ φ φ φ φ= − − + −             (12) 
We can plot the LHS and RHS of (12) as functions of p. The LHS is linearly upward sloping 
with constant slope ( *)fH s . It has value 0 at p = 0 and a value of ( *)fH s at p=1. The RHS is 
also linearly upward sloping in p, with a constant slope 
(1 ( ( ))) ( ( )) ( ( )) ( ( ))G E H E G E H Eβ φ φ φ φ+ − >0 given 
A2: 1
1 1/ ( ( ))G E
β φ> +  
At p = 0, the RHS has an intercept of (1 )(1 ( ( )) ( ( ))G E H Eβ φ φ− + >0 as long as some men enter 
the marriage market.  At p = 1, it reaches its maximum value of ( ( ))H E φ . By Proposition 2, 
( ( ))H E φ <H(s*)< ( *)fH s . Hence the RHS is higher than the LHS at p = 0 and lower than the 
LHS at p = 1: as both are linear, they have a unique intersection. This is shown in Figure 1. 
3.3.3 Effects of a skewed sex ratio 
An increase in f does not affect the RHS of (12), while it pivots the LHS upward, increasing its 
slope (shown by the dotted line in Figure 1). This reduces the equilibrium p**, worsening 
women’s marriage market odds. However, this does not affect either the divorce rate – G( ( )E φ ) 
(divorces conditional on marriage) or the fraction of men entering the marriage market – 
H( ( )E φ ) : hence it does not affect the number of divorces, either. 
 However, our main interest lies in correlating the sex ratio to the jump in divorce rates 
after a transition from a mutual consent to a unilateral divorce regime. Therefore, in the next sub-
section we will examine divorce in a mutual consent divorce regime. 
 
 
 
 15
3.3 Mutual Consent Divorce 
3.4.1 The Basics 
We now examine divorce under a mutual consent divorce regime. We start by examining 
women’s payoffs to (a) staying married if already in a marriage, Vf(MR)(b) joining the ranks of 
the “single and looking”, Vf(SL)and (c) staying off the marriage market, Vf(SNL). We have 
( ) max[ ( ), ( )]f f fV SNL s V SNL V SLβ= +                                          (13) 
Here, we have suppressed the subscript i on the per-period satisfaction that woman i gets from 
staying off the marriage market. The second term on the RHS of (13) indicates that if she 
survives into the next period she can choose either to stay as she is or to enter the pool of those 
single and looking. We also have 
( ) ( ) (1 ) max[ ( ), ( ), ( )] (1 ) ( )f f f f fV SL pE p s p V MR V SL V SNL p V SLφ β β= + − + + −          (14) 
(14) shows the utility a woman expects at the beginning of any period when she contemplates 
entering the marriage market. With probability p, a woman who is single and on the marriage 
market finds a match, from which she gets the expected satisfaction of a match E(Φ)  (note that 
she will only get information on the true satisfaction in her particular match after the first period 
of marriage). Such a woman, if she survives into the next period, then faces the choice of staying 
married, getting divorced and re-entering the marriage market, and getting divorced and going 
off the marriage market (however, by Proposition 1 no ever-married woman will go off the 
marriage market) . With probability 1 – p, the woman does not find a match and gets s, the 
satisfaction from staying single, in the current period while in the next, subject to survival, she 
re-joins the ranks of the single and looking. Again, suppressing subscripts, the satisfaction that a 
married woman gets from continuing in the marriage is given by 
( ) [ ( ), ( ), ( )]f f f fV MR Max V MR V SL V SNLφ β= +                                         (15) 
Here φ  is the true quality of her match (revealed after the first period of marriage). At any point 
in time she will stay married if the continuation value of that option exceeds the expected value 
from getting divorced and either re-entering the marriage market (from Proposition 1, she will 
never go off the marriage market after divorce).  
A married woman will therefore stay married if and only if ( ) ( )f fV MR V SL> . From 
(14) and (15), we can show that this is equivalent to 
( ) (1 )pE p sφ φ> + − =μ 
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- an event that will happen with probability 1 – G(μ). With probability G(μ), her match is 
revealed to be of sufficiently poor quality to induce her to seek a divorce and re-enter the 
marriage market. 
 Note that women who choose to stay off the marriage market have 
( ) max[ ( ), ( )]f f fV SNL V SL V MR> : for such women, we can show, using (13) and (14), that s > 
E(φ ). This happens for a fraction 1 – H(E(φ )) of women who have high enough utilities from 
staying single.  
Women who do not choose to stay single, on the other hand, have s < E(φ ). This must be 
true of any ever-married woman. As the probability of a married woman seeking a divorce is 
G(μ), we can now check that this probability is increasing in p as μ is increasing in p. The lower 
a woman’s odds of finding a match when on the marriage market, the lower the payoff she 
expects from re-entering the marriage market as a fresh divorcee, and the less her willingness to 
seek a divorce (or equivalently, the worse the quality of the marginal match which induces her to 
divorce). Applying this logic to men, we see that since any man who is looking is assured of 
finding a match, this indicates that men would be more willing to divorce than women: however, 
as divorce requires mutual consent, the woman’s willingness to divorce is the crucial factor in 
the actual incidence of divorce. 
To examine men’s motivations, we could look at equations similar to (13)-(15), setting p 
= 1. Thus a married man would like to be able to divorce if the match quality is revealed to be 
less than E(φ ). However, men realize that once married, they will only get a divorce if their 
match quality is lower than μ. Their wife’s utility from staying single, s, enters into the 
calculation of μ. Men do not know the value of s for their spouse, however, they know the 
distribution of s and can calculate the average probability (taken over all possible values of s 
between s and E(φ ) - as a woman with a higher s would not enter the marriage market) that their 
wife will wish to seek a divorce. A man who is trapped in a marriage against his will (in 
circumstances when he would like to divorce but cannot) gets a disutility of κ from each such 
period of marriage. Here, κ should be interpreted as a psychological disutility that the man gets 
as a result of frustration at not being able to get a divorce when he would like one. Under mutual 
consent, a man anticipates the probability of getting trapped in this situation, and this affects his 
willingness to enter the marriage market in the first place. While we have treated κ as a constant 
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to simplify our calculations, our results would be unaffected if we allow κ to be a decreasing 
function of φ , actual match quality (so that the worse the match, the higher the man’s disutility 
from being trapped in it). We summarize the modifications to our calculations for this case in 
footnote 8.8We now denote a man’s anticipated satisfaction from entering the marriage market 
by , ( )m aV SL . We have 
, ( )m aV SL = ( )
,
[1 ( ( )]( ) ( ) [ ( ( )) [ ( )]]
1 1
[ ( )] ( )
s
E
m a
s
G EE dg G E E G
E G V SL
φ
φ
β φ βκφ φ φ φ μβ β
β μ
−
+ − −
− −
+
∫  
Or 
, ( )m aV SL = ( )
[1 ( ( ))]( ) ( ) [ ( ( ) [ ( )]
1 1
1 [ ( )]
s
E
s
G EE dg G E E G
E G
φ
φ
β φ βκφ φ φ φ μβ β
β μ
−
+ − −
− −
−
∫
  (16) 
The explanation of the terms in (16) is as follows. A man on the marriage market is sure to find a 
match, yielding a one-period level of expected satisfaction E(φ ). Subject to surviving into the 
next period, the man would want to stay married if he discovers that his match quality exceeds 
E(φ ). This happens with probability 1 – G(E(φ )). Prior to entering the marriage market, the man 
does not of course know the value of his match. Therefore he assigns an expected value to the 
match subject to its being between E(φ ) and its maximum value φ  : this is the value he expects 
conditional on wanting to stay on in the marriage. However, the man also expects that with 
probability G(E(φ )) – Es [G( μ )], the match quality will be such that he wants to get a divorce 
but cannot, as match quality is not sufficiently poor to induce the average woman to agree to a 
divorce. Recalling that μ depends on s, the subscript s on the expectations operator denotes that 
the expectation that the wife will seek a divorce is taken over all possible values of s between s 
and E(φ ) (as a woman with a higher s would not enter the marriage market). In this event, the 
man gets a disutility κ from each such period of marriage. The man also anticipates that with 
probability Es [G( μ )], match quality will be so poor that his wife also wants to divorce : in this 
case there is a divorce and the man will return to the pool of single and looking men. 
                                                 
8 In this case, κ in (16) would be replaced by λ= E[κ(Φ)] where the expectation is taken over values of Φ between 
E(Φ) and μ. We can show that , ( )m aV SL  would still be an increasing function of p. Hence our qualitative results 
would be unaffected. 
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When deciding whether to enter the marriage market, the man compares , ( )m aV SL , the 
expected payoff of entering the marriage market, with the payoff s/(1-β) of staying off the 
marriage market. Thus a fraction 1 – H((1 – β ) , ( )m aV SL ) of men stay off the marriage market 
because their utility of remaining single outweighs the expected gains of entering the marriage 
market. 
We may verify that , ( )m aV SL increases in p. Thus, the worse a woman’s odds of finding a 
match, the stronger a man’s incentive to stay off the marriage market.  Of course, more men 
staying off the marriage market only worsens a woman’s odds of finding a match, so there is a 
feedback loop. 
Proposition 3: A larger proportion of men than women stays off the marriage market under 
mutual consent. 
Proof : In the appendix. 
3.4.2 Equilibrium 
Equilibrium under mutual consent divorce is characterized by a quadruple (p*, D*(M), N*SF(M), 
N*SM(M)) such that  
(a) The number of men on the marriage market is a fraction p* of the number of women on 
the marriage market. 
(b) All men on the marriage market get married. 
(c) No one who is off the marriage market expects to get higher utility by entering it. 
(d) All divorcees re-enter the marriage market. 
(e) Divorces occur when a woman expects to get higher utility by re-entering the marriage 
market than by staying in her current match. Men may be trapped in marriages against 
their will but take this into account when deciding whether to enter the marriage market. 
From the preceding analysis, we can infer that 
N*SF(M) = [1 – H(E(φ ))]fM                                              (17) 
N*SM(M)=[1 – H((1 – β ) , ( )( *)m aV SL p )]M                           (18) 
where we have indicated the dependence of , ( )m aV SL  on p. We also have 
D*(M) = Es [G[ ( *)pμ ] ](M – N*SM(M)) 
= Es [G[ ( *)pμ ]]H((1 – β ) , ( )( *)m aV SL p )M                                 (19) 
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(19) may be derived as follows. We have established that in a mutual consent regime, a married 
woman may expect to divorce with probability G[μ]. Averaging over all women, the divorce rate 
(ratio of divorces to marriages) is Es[G[ μ ] where the subscript s denotes that the expectation is 
taken over all possible values of s between s and E(φ ). In every new cohort of men, a fraction 
H((1- β ) , ( )( *)m aV SL p ) enter the marriage market : therefore, the number of marriages in each 
period is H((1- β ) , ( )( *)m aV SL p )M. The number of divorces is therefore the divorce rate times 
the number of marriages which is given by (19) (where the dependence of μ on p* is indicated by 
expressing μ as μ(p*)). 
 We can now solve for p* using (3), (17), (18) and (19). Substituting (17), (18) and (19) in 
(3) and canceling common terms, we obtain 
, ,
* ( ( ))
[1 (1 *)](1 [ ( ( *))]) ((1 ) ( )( *)) * [ ( ( *))]) ((1 ) ( )( *))m a m as s
fp H E
p E G p H V SL p p E G p H V SL p
φ
β μ β μ β
=
− − + − − −
                                    (20) 
We may now plot the LHS and RHS of (20) as functions of p, which necessarily lies between 0 
and 1. The LHS is linearly upward sloping with a constant slope of ( ( ))fH E φ , which is also its 
maximum value at p = 1. Its minimum value is 0, at p = 0. We assume that a large enough 
fraction of women enter the marriage market, such that 
A3 : ( ( ))fH E φ > ,((1 ) (1))m aH Vβ−  
where , (1)m aV is the payoff a man would expect from entering the marriage market if every 
woman on the marriage market were sure of finding a match. Indeed, from Proposition 3, A3 
always holds (the number of women on the marriage market is always greater than the number of 
men on it). 
 The RHS of (20) is also upward sloping. Its derivative with respect to p* is 
( (.))(1 ( (.))) (.) ( (.)) (.) [(1 (1 )) ] (.)
(.)[(1 (1 ))(1 ( (.))) ( (.))]
s
s s
s s
E GE G H E G H p p H
p
Hp E G pE G
p
β β
β
∂
+ − + − − −
∂
∂
+ − − + −
∂
          (21) 
Now, both ( (.))sE G  and (.)H  increase in p : the first because μ  increases in p : and the second 
because , ( )m aV SL increases in p. Moreover, as p cannot be greater than 1, we have 
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p(1-β)≤1-β or 1-β+ βp≥p or 1- β(1-p) ≥p. Given these conditions, we may check that a sufficient 
condition for (21) to be strictly positive is  
A4 : 1
1 1/ ( (.))sE G
β >
+
 
At p = 0, the value of the RHS – which is also its intercept – equals 
,(1 )(1 ( )) ((1 ) (0))m aG s H Vβ β− + − >0 provided that there is always at least one man who finds it 
worthwhile to enter the marriage market. At p = 1, the value of the RHS is 
,((1 ) (1))m aH Vβ− which from (A3) is less than the value of the LHS at p = 1. Since the RHS has 
a higher intercept than the LHS at p = 0 (whose value at p = 0 is simply 0) and a lower value at p 
= 1, and since both the LHS and RHS are continuous and increasing functions of p, they must 
intersect an odd number of times. Figure 2 shows us the case where they intersect once – giving 
us the equilibrium p* - while Figure 3 shows an example with 3 intersections – multiple steady 
states. 
 
 3.4.3 The Possibility of Multiplicity : Hopeful and Fearful Equilibria 
Figure 3 illustrates a case with multiple steady states. Thus, we could have a steady state triple of 
(p*1,N*SM(p*1), D*(p*1)), or (p*2,N*SM(p*2), D*(p*2)), or (p*3,N*SM(p*3), D*(p*3)) (note that 
N*SF is independent of p*, while from (8) and (10), N*SM and D* are affected by it). 
 The key to possible multiplicity is in the feedback loop connecting women’s marriage 
market odds to men’s willingness to enter the marriage market. To understand the intuition 
underlying the possibility of multiple equilibria, it is helpful to refer to a steady state 
corresponding to a high p* - and therefore a low N*SM and a high D* - as a “hopeful 
equilibrium” and to a steady state with a low p* - and therefore a high N*SM and a low D* - as a 
“fearful equilibrium”. In a “fearful equilibrium”, men fear that women face bad marriage market 
odds (low p*). Hence, they believe that any woman they marry will not easily agree to give them 
a divorce, should they want one, as she will be reluctant to re-enter the marriage market given 
her poor remarriage prospects. Men, therefore, fear being stuck in a marriage against their will, 
and in anticipation of this possibility, many of them do not enter the marriage market at all (high 
N*SM ). In turn, the fact that so many men stay off the marriage market worsens women’s 
probability of finding a match, confirming the men’s fears of a low p*. 
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 In the “hopeful equilibrium”, on the other hand, men are more optimistic. Believing that 
women’s marriage market odds are not bad (medium to high p*), they think that if their marriage 
turns out to be bad, their wife might be willing to grant them a divorce, as she will then be able 
to enter the marriage market with a fair chance of remarriage. Therefore, they are more willing to 
marry (low N*SM ). In turn, the fact that fewer men stay off the marriage market improves 
women’s probability of finding a match, confirming the men’s hopes of a high p*. 
Why do we have a unique equilibrium in the unilateral divorce case, in contrast to mutual 
consent where multiplicity is possible provided the sex ratio was not too skewed? 
 The reason is that the mechanism driving the hopeful and fearful equilibria under mutual 
consent was not applicable to unilateral divorce. Under unilateral divorce, men can get a divorce 
whenever they want it. Therefore, when deciding whether to enter the marriage market, they do 
not have to worry about women’s marriage market odds, and hence their likelihood of agreeing 
to a divorce. Thus, we see in (10) that the number of men who stay off the marriage market is 
independent of p, women’s marriage market odds. Therefore in unilateral divorce the connection 
between the number of men staying off the marriage market, and p is unidirectional instead of 
bidirectional: if fewer men enter the marriage market, this does affect women’s marriage odds: 
however, women’s marriage odds no longer affect men’s decision to enter or stay out of the 
marriage market. 
 
3.4.4 The Effects of a skewed sex ratio 
Now let us perform a simple comparative static exercise: increase f so that the sex ratio becomes 
yet more heavily tilted in favor of men.  This does not affect the RHS of (20). However, it 
increases the slope of the LHS when plotted as a function of p: the LHS pivots upward. This has 
the effect of shifting its new intersection with the RHS to the left, so that the equilibrium p* 
decreases. Thus a woman on the marriage market is less likely to find a match. In both Figures 2 
and 3, we show the new LHS as a dotted line. In Figure 3, the effect is to destroy the multiplicity 
of equilibria, so that the LHS now only intersects the RHS once, at a p lower than p*1, the left-
most of the previous intersections. The interpretation of this is that a heavily skewed sex ratio 
makes it hard for men to be optimistic about women’s marriage market odds – therefore the 
“hopeful equilibria” disappear. 
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 What about D*(M)? From (19), we can see that as p* falls, the number of divorces 
D*(M) falls because of two reasons. First, the equilibrium divorce rate - Es[G[ μ ] – falls as p* 
falls (a fall in p* decreases μ). As women have a lower probability of finding a match, due to an 
unfavorable sex ratio, already married women are less keen to get divorced and re-enter the 
marriage market. Secondly, the number of divorces falls for an additional reason – fewer 
marriages as H((1- β ) , ( )( *)m aV SL p ) falls.  Men expect a lower payoff from entering the 
marriage market as the lower the p*, the more likely they are to find themselves trapped in a 
marriage against their will, and unable to get a divorce. This induces many men to stay off the 
marriage market, reducing the number of marriages and hence of divorces.  
In conclusion, therefore, a more skewed sex ratio results in fewer divorces – both as a 
fraction of total marriages and as a fraction of the total population - under a mutual consent 
regime. This leads us to our main result. 
Proposition 4: The size of the jump in divorce rates following divorce law liberalization is 
larger when the sex ratio is more skewed. Moreover, the size of the jump in divorces as a fraction 
of the population is also larger for a more skewed sex ratio. 
Proof: We have already shown that a more skewed sex ratio – a higher f – leads to a lower 
divorce rate in a mutual consent regime, lowering Es[G[ μ ]. The divorce rate in a unilateral 
divorce regime is G[E(φ )] which is higher than the divorce rate in mutual consent as long as p* 
< 1 (as s < E(φ ) in mutual consent, for any woman ever on the marriage market). However this 
divorce rate is unaffected by f. Therefore, an increase in f does not affect the divorce rate under a 
unilateral regime but decreases it under a mutual consent regime. Thus the jump in divorce rates 
after a liberalization of the regime is larger when f increases. Moreover, the fraction of men 
entering the marriage market in a unilateral divorce regime, H[E(φ )], is unaffected by f, while 
rises in f lower the fraction of men entering the marriage market under mutual consent. Hence 
while divorces as a fraction of the population under unilateral divorce, G[E(φ )]H[E(φ )], are 
unaffected by f, a more skewed sex ratio lowers divorces as a fraction of the population under 
mutual consent. Thus the size of the jump in divorces as a fraction of the population is also 
positively related to the degree of skewness. Q.E.D 
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3.4.5 Discussion 
Note that in our model the only reason why men and women differ in their willingness to divorce 
is the skewness of the sex ratio. For a balanced sex ratio, women’s willingness to divorce would 
equal men’s as women would also be certain of finding a partner in the event of divorce.9 
 Our non-transferability assumption (or equivalently our assumption of high transaction 
costs) is also important here. As explained earlier, with perfect transferability a husband could 
compensate his wife to the point where her willingness to divorce him would match his 
willingness to divorce her.  
 As explained in the introduction, we have abstracted from differences in property 
settlement across the sexes in the event of divorce, or from prenuptial contracts or marriage 
payments. Intriguingly though, the above analysis does suggest one additional rationale for such 
phenomena. Since men may be trapped against their will in a marriage when they would prefer 
to divorce, or women may be forced to leave a marriage when they would have preferred not to, 
both sexes may need devices to provide partial insurance against such risks. Prenuptial contracts, 
marriage payments or property settlement laws are examples of just such devices. Of course, we 
do not claim that this is the only reason for the existence of such devices. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
Our main purpose in this paper has been to examine the three-way interaction between sex ratios, 
divorce rates and divorce law changes. The model we construct is motivated by the discovery of 
a significant cross country correlation indicating that countries with more skewed sex ratios 
experienced a larger jump in divorce rates following liberalization in their divorce laws. We have 
constructed a theoretical model in which people lack information about their potential matches 
until the time they actually marry them.  However, they receive a signal in the first period of 
marriage regarding their future compatibility with the mate they have chosen. This, along with 
the expected payoff from divorce, into which potential remarriage prospects enter, determines 
each partner’s willingness to divorce – a willingness which differs across partners owing to a 
skewed sex ratio.  This in turn implies that the actual divorce rate will differ depending on 
                                                 
9 Assuming away differences in intrinsic preferences (ie not allowing φ  to vary by gender) enables us to isolate 
differences in willingness to divorce across gender that are solely attributable to a skewed sex ratio. We make the 
above abstraction in order to sharply focus on the effects of a skewed sex ratio. 
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whether mutual consent is required for divorce (in which case the less willing partner’s 
preferences determine the divorce rate) or whether unilateral divorce is allowed. 
A chief implication of the model is that the jump in divorce rates following a transition 
from mutual consent to unilateral divorce will be larger if the sex ratio is skewed: it will be 
relatively small for a more balanced sex ratio. This has significant implications for social policy.  
States that are ill-equipped to handle the social consequences of a sudden jump in divorces need 
to look at their sex ratios when contemplating a liberalization of their divorce regimes. A natural 
extension of our research (for which we lack data at present) would be to rigorously empirically 
test the effect of sex ratio changes on a change in divorce rates following divorce law 
liberalization. For instance, this could be done in a “natural experiment” like setting where some 
states experience large shocks to their sex ratios, provided there are other states which also 
liberalize their divorce laws but do not experience such shocks.  
Another interesting result is that under mutual consent divorce laws, men’s hopes or fears 
about women’s marriage market odds are self-confirming and create the possibility of multiple 
equilibria – either a “fearful” equilibrium with few men being willing to marry and poor 
marriage prospects for women, or a more “hopeful” equilibrium with more men marrying and 
better marriage prospects for women. However, multiplicity vanishes either if the sex ratio is 
heavily skewed or if divorce laws change permitting unilateral divorce. From a policy 
perspective, a state that does not wish to liberalize its divorce laws but wishes to increase its 
marriage rate – perhaps regarding marriage as a desirable outcome – could possibly do so by 
announcing pro-marriage incentives (for instance, tax breaks for married couples). Apart from 
the direct incentive effect, our analysis suggests that such an announcement would serve as a 
“co-ordination device” co-ordinating men’s expectations on the “hopeful equilibrium” rather 
than the “fearful” one. Because they would expect these incentives to have an effect, men would 
assume that women’s chances of marriage would improve. This would induce them to be less 
fearful about the possibility of being trapped in a marriage, unable to get a divorce, and would 
encourage them to marry. 
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Appendix 
The Correlations 
The correlations mentioned in the introduction are performed using data on European 
countries – to which we also add data from Australia and New Zealand. Our data on divorce 
rates in European countries at different points of time, as well as our data on which of these 
shifted to unilateral divorce and when they did so, is drawn from Gonzalez and Viitanen (2006), 
supplemented by Eurostat data. Data on sex ratios is available from the World Development 
Indicators. Data on divorce rates and timing of laws in Australia and New Zealand is drawn from 
multiple sources.10 Our method has been to correlate the size of changes in divorce rates in 
countries after they transited to unilateral divorce, with the sex ratio prevailing in the relevant 
countries at the time of the regime shift.11  Our sample included 14 European countries which 
had all transited to unilateral divorce regimes – Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, 
Greece, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the 
United Kingdom; we also included Australia and New Zealand. Our choice of countries is 
                                                 
10 Data on divorce rates at the time of transition to unilateral divorce (1975 in Australia, 1981 in New Zealand) is 
drawn from the United Nations Demographic Yearbook (1968,1982). Data on recent (2002) divorce rates is from 
Americans for Divorce Reform and is available at http://www.divorcemag.com/statistics/statsWorld.shtml. 
11 Note that sex ratios in different countries have remained largely stable over time.  
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dictated by data considerations : we were not able to find comparable data, particularly on timing 
of divorce law liberalization, for other countries. 
We expressed the sex ratio as the number of women per 100 people (more than 50 in all the 
countries under consideration)12, and computed the size of the long-term jump13 in divorce rates 
as the difference between the divorce rate some 20 to 25 years after the regime shift and the 
divorce rate immediately prior to the shift.14 The correlation between these two variables was 
positive with a coefficient of 0.547, and the correlation was significant at the 5% level.  We 
tabulate the relevant figures below. Note that the sex ratio in the tables is expressed as the 
number of women per 100 population. In terms of our model this would be F/(M+F) = f/(1+f) 
which is an increasing function of f. 
 
 
 
Table 1 
Country Sex ratio as number of 
women per 100 
population 
Long term jump in 
divorce rates after transit 
to unilateral divorce 
Austria 52.79 .2 
Belgium 51.06 .2 
Denmark 50.71 0 
Finland 51.58 .2 
Germany 52.59 .2 
Greece 51.04 .1 
Luxembourg 50.63 .2 
Netherlands 50.13 .1 
                                                 
12 Due to the stability of sex ratios over the time periods studied (as mentioned in the previous footnote), there is no 
reason to expect a marked difference between overall sex ratios and sex ratios at marriage. Thus the simplifying 
assumption maintained in our theoretical framework that sex ratios do not vary across birth cohorts is likely to be 
valid.  
13 The reason for looking at the long-term effect is that some of the mechanisms in our model – such as changes in 
decisions on whether to enter the marriage market at all – might take time to work as people slowly adjust their 
expectations and behavior patterns. 
14 The exception is Switzerland, which only experienced the regime shift in 2000. For Switzerland we computed the 
jump using the latest available divorce rate figures and subtracting the pre-2000 divorce rate. 
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Norway 50.52 0 
Portugal 52.46 .3 
Spain 51.15 .2 
Sweden 50.08 .2 
Switzerland 51.1 .1 
United Kingdom 51.54 .2 
Australia 50.2 .17 
New Zealand 50.2 -.1 
Correlation coefficient .547  
p value .0464  
 
Data on change in divorce rates (expressed in terms of divorces per thousand mid-year population) is taken from 
Eurostat. Data on sex ratios is from the World Development Indicators (World Bank). 
 
 In our correlation we use overall sex ratios, rather than the sex ratios between cohorts 
who marry each other (for which we lack data). It may be argued, therefore, that the skewness of 
the sex ratios in the countries we have looked at merely represents the greater longevity of 
women but not the ratios of marriageable women and men in the population. We have two 
responses to this criticism. First, we point to the stability of the sex ratio across time and over 
cohorts. Secondly, as men usually tend to marry slightly younger women, a positive population 
growth rate would imply even more marriageable women per cohort of marriageable men 
(Maitra 2006) – thus strengthening our results.  
Our positive and significant correlation coefficient does not prove causality but does 
indicate a positive association between the size of the jump in divorce rates following a shift to 
unilateral divorce laws, and the skewness of the sex ratio. Moreover, since we are looking not at 
absolute divorce rates, but at changes in divorce rates, time-invariant country-specific factors 
become irrelevant. Exploring these relationships further, perhaps with a larger sample of 
countries and controls, remains part of a future agenda for research. 
Proof of Proposition 3 
Under mutual consent, men’s anticipated utility from entering the marriage market is given by 
(16). If men were free to obtain a divorce whenever they wanted it, the terms in κ in the 
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numerator of the RHS of (16) would vanish. Thus the numerator would increase. Moreover, the 
denominator would change as the term [ ( )]sE G μ  would be replaced by G(E(Φ)) – the new 
probability that a married man would get divorced and re-enter the marriage pool. Note that E(Φ) 
necessarily exceeds μ = pE(Φ) + (1 – p)s as E(Φ) > s for the relevant range of s over which 
expectations are taken. Therefore G(E(Φ)) > [ ( )]sE G μ  so that the denominator of (16) would 
shrink. An increase in the numerator and a drop in the denominator would mean that a man 
entering the marriage market would expect a higher payoff under unilateral than under mutual 
consent divorce, hence the proportion of men entering the marriage market would be higher in 
unilateral divorce than the proportion of men who enter the marriage market under mutual 
consent. However, note that in a unilateral divorce regime, men do not want to enter the marriage 
market unless s < E(Φ). Similarly, women in a mutual consent regime do not want to enter the 
marriage market unless s < E(Φ). Since the distribution of s across the sexes is identical, the 
proportion of women entering the marriage market in mutual consent must equal the proportion 
of men entering the marriage market in unilateral divorce. We must infer by transitivity that if 
the proportion of men entering the marriage market in unilateral divorce is higher than the 
proportion of men entering the marriage market under mutual consent (which we have just 
shown), then the proportion of women entering the marriage market in mutual consent is higher 
than the proportion of men entering the marriage market in mutual consent. Q.E.D 
 
Figure 1 : Unilateral Divorce
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Figure 2: Mutual Consent, Unique Equilibrium
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Figure 3 : Mutual Consent, Multiple Equilibria
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